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I present behavioural data contributing to existing research that (implicit) self-predictions are overly 
reliant on current intentions at the time of the decision (Koehler & Poon, 2006). Results are 
consistent with previous findings that self-predictions are often insensitive to translatability cues 
and overly influenced by desirability cues. We show that although participants typically benefit 
from a reminder, it is undervalued at the time of the decision (Experiment 1 & 3a) as participants 
are not willing to pay for a reminder service, unless it is offered free of charge (Experiment 2). Our 
findings also show that participants fail to incorporate temporal delay sufficiently in their opt-in 
decisions, even though temporal delay was found to be a significant predictor return behaviour 
(Experiments 1, 2 & 3b). Instead, decisions were found to be highly influenced by desirability factors 
(Experiments 1 & 2) which were not significant predictors of task completion. Finally, using a 
construal manipulation intended to induce participants to think about the decision options in either 
a concrete or abstract way influenced decisions (Experiment 3a), and subsequently influenced how 
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It is not surprising that there are many situations in the real world where people must 
decide to forgo a small immediate reward for one that is larger but delayed. For example, people 
who are dieting must refrain from dessert in the hopes of reaching their long-term reward of weight 
loss. In consumer situation, what would you do if you were presented with the choice of using a $1 
coupon today or a $5 coupon that could be used in a future shopping trip? In both of these 
situations, the events rely on making predictions about future behaviours; however these 
predictions hold uncertainties with regards to their outcome. One must decide whether they will 
ultimately stick to their diet, or decide whether they will be making a shopping trip later that 
month. The current paper examines what factors affect predictions of future behaviours and 
whether or not these factors are predictive of actual future behaviour, with a focus on how such 











Role of Self-Predictions in Decision Making 
Expected value theory is a normative theory of decision making of how people should make 
decisions under uncertainty.  The idea is that if there is uncertainty or an unknown probability 
regarding possible outcomes of the decision, then the person will select the option that has the 
highest expected value (EV). EV of choice can be written as: 
                                                           EV{x} = P1V1 + P2V2 + . . . + PnVn, 
Where P represents a probability of each specific outcome and V represents the utility of 
the gain or loss associated with the specific outcome. Maximizing EV means that a decision maker 
given a choice should select the action which will yield the highest expected value over the long run.  
Often the relevant outcome probabilities are not known but rather must be estimated, subjectively, 
by the decision maker.  Subjective probability is the perceived likelihood that a consequence will 
occur as a result of the specific behaviour. The normative theory of choice under uncertainty 
assumes that a person will maximize subjective expected values, using their subjective probabilities. 
This theory assumes that probabilities and utilities can be calculated by the decision maker.  
 The present research focuses on the role of (implicit) self-predictions of future behaviour in 
decision making.  Consider a simple example in which a person can either receive a smaller amount 
$X with certainty, or a greater amount $Y if he or she carries out a certain behaviour B at future 
point in time.  This decision requires a comparison of the expected value of the two options.  In 
particular, the EV of the second option depends on the perceived or self-predicted probability that 
future behaviour B will in fact be carried out; that is, the EV of this option is P(B) x V($Y).  Making a 
good decision in this situation, then, requires that the decision maker accurately estimate P(B), the 
likelihood of future behaviour B. 
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 Much research now however focuses on how many evaluations of probabilities toward 
future events are distorted, and are in fact susceptible to a number of cognitive biases (or 
heuristics) which may lead to behavioural errors that have costs associated with them (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973; 1979).  One cognitive bias that is often observed with regards to self-prediction of 

















Over-Optimistic Effect  
When it comes to predicting task completions people tend to be over-optimistic with 
respect to the duration that the task will take. This is often called the “planning fallacy” (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) and it is the tendency for people to predict they will finish projects earlier than 
they do. This effect has been examined and found across many different domains. For example, 
when asked to predict how long it would take for a task to be completed, people often set 
inappropriately shorter completion deadlines that do not match up with actual completion times. 
The effect has been examined in-lab, with a formatting task (Weick & Guinote, 2010), and has been 
extensively researched in more applied situations such as: completion date for an honours thesis 
(Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994); Christmas shopping (Buehler & Griffin, 2003); completing tax forms 
(Newby-Clark et al., 2000); personal savings (Koehler, White & John, 2009); donating blood (Koehler 
& Poon, 2006), and proof-reading an assignment (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002).    
In these and in many prediction studies, self-predictions are measured via estimates of date 
completion. In other tasks such as assignments or formatting documents, self-predictions are 
measured by an estimate of how long they believe a task will take to complete. This estimate is 
then compared to the task’s actual completion date or duration. The common result is that the 
predicted task completion date/time is largely over-optimistic with regards to the actual task 
completion date/time. In other words, people typically underestimate the amount of time the task 
will take to complete.   
Some studies utilize probability scales to measure how likely one is to carry out a future 
behaviour. For example, Koehler and Poon (2006) used a 0-100% probability scale to elicit self- 
predictions of future behaviour and reported that the predicted probability exceeded the factual 
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rate of the target behaviour. In the current research, I examine the decision that a person makes in 
a genuine dichotomous fashion (either a person chooses to commit to a behaviour or not) and use 
this as an implicit measure of intention strength. Although this method does not directly measure 
intention strength, it indirectly assumes that a person’s response is contingent on their intentions 
















Factors Influencing Predictions about Future Behaviours 
Although there is some research which suggests that optimistic predictions can in some 
cases facilitate behaviour, as in have self-fulfilling effects on behaviour, many different cognitive 
processes have been used to help explain the underlying effects of the over-optimistic effect. 
Soman (1998) suggests that people often underweight the negative value of future effort because 
this future effort is not salient at the time of making the decision. So although a choice may seem 
attractive at the time of making it, the event may become unappealing when it actually comes to 
exerting the effort to follow through with the task. Based on this notion, although people at the 
time of a decision may have high intentions in completing a task in the distant future, they may be 
subsequently less likely to follow through with it (compared to the near future). However, where 
future effort is salient predictions of future behaviour should reflect this, resulting in an increased 
likelihood of carrying out the behaviour.  
The idea that less reliable knowledge and information is available in order to make a fully 
informed decision when making a decision based on the distant future, is also compatible with 
temporal construal theory. Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak (2007), maintain that predictions 
regarding distant future events are more based on the desirability of completing the behaviour, 
whereas predictions regarding temporally near events are based more on the feasibility (the ease of 
difficulty of reaching an end state) of the behaviour, such that decisions regarding near future 
events may exhibit a stronger intention – behaviour relationship (Trope & Liberman, 1998). The 
authors entertain the idea that overoptimistic decisions regarding future behaviours may be 
reflecting an underweighting of feasibility.  
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A focus on potential obstacles may also affect predictions. Research shows that people are 
more concerned with potential obstacles that may interfere with the target behaviour when making 
self-predictions about a task that is temporally closer in time. However when the target behaviour is 
temporally further in the future, people tend to underestimate the extent to which these obstacles 
that may hinder performance (Peetz, Buehler, & Wilson, 2010).  
All of this research suggests that at the time of a decision, there is an inaccurate use of 
informational cues at the time of the decision that makes self-predictions susceptible to over-
optimism with regards to future behaviour. Specifically I maintain that the decision-maker relies on 
the strength of their current intentions, which is often overweighed at the time of the decision, and 












Intention-Based Predictions  
The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 1991) recognizes intention 
strength and perceived behavioural control as the two key predictors of future behaviour. However, 
predictive accuracy dwindles when new and unfamiliar factors enter the situation. When the 
situation is under complete behavioural control of the person, behaviour is readily predicted by 
intentions alone. In general, the stronger the intention, the more likely it is that the behaviour will 
be carried out. The predictive accuracy of intention strength is higher when intentions remain 
relatively stable across time and when complete control is achievable. Furthermore, translatability 
factors (how readily the intentions can turn into action) affect the predictive validity of current 
intentions to the extent that intention strength at T1 will be a valid predictor of behaviour at T2, 
only when intention strength is stable over T1 and T2 and that the intention strength at T2 is readily 
translated into action.  
Self-predictions typically place substantial weight on current intentions with respect to the 
target behaviour at the time of prediction (Koehler & Poon, 2006). Since current intentions are an 
easily accessible cue, it is used as an evaluative starting point.  Although using current intentions 
strength is believed to be a useful cue in predicting the likelihood of future behaviour, other 
extraneous situational factors that influence translatability are often not considered at the time of 
prediction. As a result, factors increasing translatability are often undervalued and 
underappreciated at the time of the decision, which may result in costly consequences. In general, 
less weight should be placed on intentions, when the predictive validity is low. However previous 
research shows that intuitive predictions are often insensitive to the validity of predictive cues 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  
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Koehler and Poon (2006) examined intentions toward completing a web-based study which 
was offered after an initial study.  Desirability cues were manipulated in order to activate stronger 
intentions to complete the web study. The authors found that although intentions influenced self-
predictions, it had little effect in their actual behaviour. Translatability cues were manipulated by 
sending an email reminder to one group of participants. The reminder was found to impact task 
completion behaviour, but showed only a small impact on self-predictions. This provides evidence 
that factors influencing the predictive validity of current intentions are underweighted at the time 
of self-prediction.  
Another study (Koehler, White & John, 2011) examined the actual costs of making overly 
optimistic decisions by examining predictions toward a financial savings goal with co-op students. 
Students were asked to predict how much they could save by the end of the term. Again, in order to 
manipulate translatability, some students were asked to fill out a monthly progress report designed 
to increase goal achievement. Those who received and completed the monthly progress reports 
were more likely to report reaching their savings goal at the end of the term. However, participants 
underestimated the impact that the savings goal program had on actual savings goal achievement 








The Current Experiments 
Most of the previous work on self-predictions, described above, has elicited explicit 
predictions from participants, e.g., in the form of a probability judgment.  The present research 
focuses on how biases in self-prediction can influence decisions that are contingent on such 
predictions, and in particular explores the possibility that biases in self-prediction can lead to 
suboptimal decisions.  While the Koehler et al. (2011) study on savings predictions did include an 
experiment investigating decisions as well as explicit self-predictions, they relied on a potential 
problematic self-report measure of actual behaviour.  Here an objective behaviour measure is used, 
and a wider variety of factors influencing decisions contingent on self-predictions are investigated. 
The objectives of the current research is to examine the previous finding that people often 
fail to accurately weigh translatability factors at the time of decision compared to actual behaviour. 
The current research is focused on how information cues that are available at the time of the 
decision will impact predictions and resulting behaviour. The information cues we manipulated are 
related to translatability and desirability factors1. In each of the experiments, participants after 
completing a filler task for a small amount of monetary reward are presented with the decision to 
forgo the smaller payment in favour of a larger amount of money to be received if they agree to 
(and actually complete) a second task in the future.  Participants’ predictions were elicited implicitly 
as they were simply offered a dichotomous choice of whether or not to opt to complete the second 
task.  
                                                          
1
 We cannot rule the possibility that desirability factors may interact with translatability factors. However, we 
doubt this is a huge concern in our studies since the amount of money offered in the experiments is quite 
modest. Our main aim was to choose a desirability factor that would affect the strength of intentions, and it 
we feel it is reasonable to believe that amount of money would influence desirability. 
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According to the normative model, people should base their decision in this situation on a 
comparison of the expected value of the two options (either taking the smaller amount S now, or 
opting for the larger amount L later after completing a second task T).  The expected value of the 
second option is given by P(T) x V(L), and it should be chosen if and only if it is greater than V(S).  
Thus the self-predicted likelihood of completing the second task, P(T), is a critical component of the 
decision.  Systematic biases in the evaluation of P(T), therefore, may lead to suboptimal decisions.  
For instance, if people are overly optimistic about their likelihood of returning to complete the 
second task, then the expected value of that option may be overestimated relative to that of taking 
the smaller amount immediately2. 
 Translatability was manipulated by offering a reminder service that is intended to help 
increase participants’ overall task completion, but is often undervalued at the time of prediction 
(Koehler & Poon, 1996). Depending on what condition participants are randomly placed in, the 
reminder service is either offered for free; may be purchased for a small fee that is deducted from 
the final payment upon completion of a second task; or are selected to receive no reminder.  The 
amount of time delay between the initial task and the secondary task was also manipulated. Since 
participants tend to make predictions that are more overly optimistic when the target task is in the 
distant future (Trope & Liberman, 1997), temporal delay between the initial task and the secondary 
task was considered to be a translatability factor which may not be given adequate weight at the 
time of the prediction. Finally, monetary incentives are used to motivate participants to opt-in for 
the secondary task, which may ultimately lead participants to be more overly optimistic. Decisions 
                                                          
2
 The role of temporal discounting in opt-in decisions was largely ignored in the current experiments since it is 
not pertinent to the methodology and is considered to be independent of the main hypotheses of the 
experiments. In the current studies it is assumed that $8 tomorrow would be worth the same next week. 
However, it should be noted that the economic theory of temporal discounting would predict that at the time 
of the decision, the value of $4 next week would be discounted relative to next day. 
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tend to be based on incentives and amount of future effort (Soman, 1998), however since amount 
of future effort was not manipulated in the current studies we assume that incentives may affect 
decisions to a larger degree.  
The two primary dependent variables in this study are (a) the proportion of participants 
who elect to complete the second task at a future date rather than taking the smaller immediate 
payment and (b) the proportion of those participants opting in who actually do return to complete 
the second task. Because these are dichotomous dependent variables, as suggested by Sutton 
(1998) we chose to use logistical regression as the appropriate way to analyze our data.  
Logistic regression is related to linear regression, but rather than explaining a metric 
dependent measure, logistical regression is formulated to predict and explain categorical 
dichotomous variables. Thus in this study, all of the independent variables were coded as 
categorical variables and one of the categories (usually the first) is used as a reference category to 
which all other categories are compared. In this case, the first category of each predictor was used. 
The tear-down approach was utilized meaning that only significant independent variables were 
included in the final logistical regression analyses. Step 1 included all significant main effects and 
step 2 of the analysis included all of the significant interaction terms. By using the category 
coefficients, the model can predict the probability of the decision to complete a task based on 
which of the predictor categories the participants belong to. Positive category coefficients reported 
in the tables within this paper indicate that the likelihood to deciding to return is larger for the 
reference category of that variable. The Wald statistic, which has a chi-square distribution, indicates 
whether the B coefficient for that predictor is significantly different from zero. If it is significantly 
different from zero, one can assume that the variable is making a significant contribution to the 





 Participants.   294 undergraduate students (148 men and 146 women) were recruited from 
the Student Life Centre to participate in a study on “Cognitive styles involved with prediction” at the 
University of Waterloo in Southern Ontario, Canada. The average age of the participants was 20 
years, SD= 2.44. Eight participants were excluded from analysis because they had already 
completed the study. 
Procedure.   We employed a 2 (time delay: short vs. long) x 2 (payment: low vs. high) x 3 
(reminder: reminder vs. no reminder vs. purchased reminder) between subjects design. At time 1, 
we gave participants an initial short filler questionnaire to complete, which included a couple 
relatively easy probability questions. Once completed, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of 12 conditions and were presented with a decision to volunteer for a second questionnaire. 
Specifically, participants were then given the option of receiving $1 at the present time (for 
completing the initial questionnaire) or foregoing the initial payment for a chance to receive a 
larger incentive by completing a second questionnaire made available to complete after a certain 
amount of time delay. Other relevant information was also included so that participants could make 
their decision. We randomly assigned participants to receive either $4 (a considerably low payment) 
or $8 (a considerably high payment, especially for students) upon completion of the second 
questionnaire. Furthermore, we informed participants when they would be required to return.  
Participants in the short time delay condition would be required to return the next day; whereas 
those in the long time delay would be scheduled to return exactly in a week plus 1 day’s time3.  
                                                          
3
 This was done In order to keep the second session on the same day of the week for both the next day and 
next week participants. 
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Lastly, we randomly assigned participants to one of three reminder conditions. In the free reminder 
condition participants were promised a reminder in the form of an email the night before they were 
expected to return. In the purchased reminder condition, participants were presented with a choice 
to receive a reminder service for the cost of $1, which would be deducted from their final payment 
upon completion of the second session. Finally, participants in the no reminder condition were 
given no such information about a reminder (no email reminder was sent out) and served as our 
control group.  If participants chose to receive the $1 payment rather than returning to complete 
the second questionnaire; they were thanked, compensated for their time and finished with the 
study. 
At the second session (either next day /1 week later depending on the condition) return 
behaviour was measured by the probability that X number of participants who opted for the second 
questionnaire actually completed it.  We recorded and scored participants on a dichotomous 
variable as either 0= did return as expected, or 1=did not return for second questionnaire. 
Returning participants first completed the Cognitive Reflective Task (Frederick, 2005) and the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) which measures rational and experiential 
thinking styles.   
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Translatability factor of reminder is expected to be underweighted in opt-in decisions 
relative to its actual impact. 
 
H2: Implicit intentions are hypothesized to be less predictive at longer time intervals; 




H3: Monetary incentives should have an effect on self-predictions of returning (and hence 
opt-in decisions), although they may not have an effect on actual behaviour. 
 
Results 
 Decision.   Overall, 149 (51%) participants decided to take the $1 reward and chose not to 
complete the second portion of the study, whereas 145 (49%) chose to forego the $1 payment and 
opted-in to complete the second questionnaire. Only three out of 106 (3%) decided to purchased 
the reminder service (for a $1 cost). These participants were combined with the free reminder 
condition to form the reminded condition (N= 105). The other participants who chose not to 
purchase a reminder service were combined with the control condition to form the unreminded 
condition (N= 189). 
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors in making the decision to 
participate in the additional questionnaire in the future, we conducted a logistical regression 
analysis (N= 249). Step 1 included the payment and time delay variables and step 2 included a 
payment by time delay interaction term. The final overall model was significant X2 (3) = 12.77, p= 
.005 (see Table 1). As expected the variable of reminder was not a significant predictor in this 
model.  The first significant predictor in the source model was payment amount, X2 (1) = 11.4, p= 
.001. The results indicate that the odds of opting in the $8 condition were .31 times higher than in 
the $4 condition. Time delay was also significant predictor in the model, X2 (1) = 4.63, p= .031, 
indicating that participants were .48 times more likely to opt into the next week condition 
compared to the next day condition. A payment amount by time delay interaction was also found to 
be significant, X2 (1) = 4.7, p= .03. In order to discover where the differences are, we split the file on 
payment amount and re-ran a regression with time delay separately for each payment amount. The 
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regression was only significant for the $4 condition, indicating that participants were two times 
more likely to opt-in into the next week/$4 condition compared to the next day/$4 condition,   
X2(1) = 4.63, p=.031. The regression was non-significant for the $8 condition, X2(1) = .817, p=.36. 
 
Table 1.  
 
  
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 





Time -.736 .342 4.628 1 .031 .479 .245 .937 
Money -1.175 .348 11.410 1 .001 .309 .156 .611 
Money 
by Time 
1.038 .478 4.710 1 .030 2.823 1.106 7.208 
Constant .736 .254 8.416 1 .004 2.087     
 
 
Task completion.   Of the 145 participants who claimed that they would return for the 
second session, 91 people (63%) returned as promised, whereas 54 people (37%) did not.  No 
differences were found between participants who refused to purchase a reminder and participants 
who were in the unreminded condition in return behaviour, X2(1) = 1.1, p=.29. Given that there are 
no differences found between this subset of participants it is reasonable to believe that participants 
who refused the reminder (i.e., they didn’t believe they would need one) were not more likely to 
return. Henceforth, for the subsequent analysis we analyzed return behaviour with these two 
subgroups combined to create the unreminded condition.   
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors of task completion behaviour, we 
conducted a logistical regression analysis (N= 91). Step 1 included the variables time delay and 
reminder, making the final overall model significant, X2 (2) = 21.4, p< .001 (see Table 2). The first 
significant predictor of task completion was time delay, X2 (1) = 17, p< .001. The results indicate that 
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participants were approximately 5 times more likely to return in the next day condition compared 
to the next week condition. The reminder variable was also near significance in the model, X2 (1) = 
2.67, p= .1, indicating that the reminded participants were 2 times more likely to return than those 





B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Time 1.603 .389 17.009 1 .000 4.969 2.319 10.645 
Reminder .660 .404 2.671 1 .102 1.934 .877 4.267 
Constant -4.172 .996 17.558 1 .000 .015     
 
 
Summary of results and discussion.   The results are consistent with the idea that the self-
prediction bias is attributable to an overreliance of current intentions.  Decisions to return for the 
second task were influenced by the desirability factor of payment amount, with more participants 
opting to complete the second questionnaire when the payment was high (57%) compared to when 
the payment option was low (41%). However, amount of money was not a significant predictor of 
task completion (see Figure 1). The translatability factor of time delay did not affect participants 
(implicit) self-predictions of returning as 52% opted in for the next week condition compared to 
47% in the next day condition. However, time delay did influence task completion with 87% of 
participants actually returned in the next day condition, compared to only 41% returning in the next 
week condition (see Figure 2). Although it only approached statistical significance, the reminder was 
found to be at least slightly associated with an increase in task completion behaviour (p=.1), 
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although the reminder was undervalued at the time of decision (see Figure 3).  Indeed only three 
participants purchased the reminder service, further showing that the reminder was underutilized 
by participants. Finally, a time by money interaction indicated that predictions were more sensitive 
to time delay when participants were in the $4 payment condition, being more likely to opt in, next 

































Note.  This result is inconsistent with the economic prediction involving temporal discounting, which would predict that 
the decision of $4 next week would be discounted relative to $4 next day. This further suggests that temporal 
discounting did not pose a problem in our studies and in fact shows that we are obtaining the opposite pattern of what 













The tendency to focus on current intentions when making (implicit) self-predictions led 
participants to underestimate the impact that a temporal delay would have on their behaviour.  
Indeed these findings are consistent with research reporting that when a future planned behaviour 
is temporally near, participants may be more likely to think about the potential obstacles that may 
hinder performance. Perhaps the low opt-in rate for the $4 condition/next day condition show that 
participants are better able to discern what obstacles they may encounter the next day, and 
therefore are better able to discern whether or not the payoff is worth the effort (i.e., the $4 
payment may not have been worth it for those able to think about the near future). When the 
future planned behaviour is in the distant future, however, participants may be less able to consider 
and incorporate situational factors that may hinder performance and as a result are more 
influenced by the desirability of attaining the money in their predictions. So, although $4 appears to 
be great compensation at the time of the decision, the participant is not aware that the task will 
look less attractive as it comes temporally closer in time. Participants base their self-predictions on 
their current intentions and therefore underestimate the need for and the impact of the reminder 
on their behaviour, even though it was shown to marginally improve return rates.  
Since our reminder service did not yield a large effect as we expected (p=.1), in the next 
study we made some minor changes that we hoped would increase the effect of the reminder 
service. We also wanted to create a comparison group for the optional purchased reminder 
condition, by replacing the “free” reminder condition with a “free optional” reminder condition. If 
participants still don’t opt for the reminder service, even when it is free, it would imply that they 
feel they don’t need to be reminded. If participants only choose the reminder service when it is 
offered for free, it implies that they undervalue the reminder service, and feel its value is not over 
$1. One of the flaws due to the design of Experiment 1 is that we did not have access to data on 





 Participants.   203 undergraduate students (123 men and 80 women; 1 undisclosed) were 
recruited from the University of Waterloo in Southern Ontario, Canada. The average age of the 
participants was 21 years, SD= 2.12.  One participant who already completed the study was 
excluded from analysis. Data for four participants were excluded because the amount of money in 
the decision box was not consistent with the other information on the sent reminders (due to 
human error).  
Procedure.   The procedure for Experiment 2 was virtually the same as that mentioned in 
Experiment 1, except for a few notable changes. Instead of the free reminder condition, we 
replaced it with a free optional reminder condition, where we gave participants the choice of 
receiving a reminder service free of charge (if they decided they would like to complete a second 
questionnaire). We also extended the reminder service to include a reminder sticker at session 1, 
and also gave participants the option of including a cell phone number by which they would receive 
a text message in addition to the email reminder the night before participants were expected to 
return for session 2. Participants were run during the summer term in a Mathematics building. 
 Upon completion of the study we attempted to get feedback from participants who did not 
return for the second questionnaire after agreeing to do it. Since we can only get data from those 
who return for the second questionnaire, we addressed this issue by sending these participants an 
email asking them to reply to the email with a brief description for why they did not return for the 
questionnaire. We were interested in finding evidence of whether participants simply forgot to 
return or whether they decided that the effort involved was simply not worth the amount of money 




 Decision.   Overall, 126 (62%) participants decided to take the $1 reward and not complete 
the second portion of the questionnaire, whereas only 77 (38%) participants chose to forego the $1 
payment and opted-in to complete the second questionnaire. 
 61 out of the 66 participants (92%) who were given a choice to receive a free reminder 
opted to receive one. Due to this low number, the five participants who did not choose to receive a 
free reminder were combined with the no reminder condition to form the unreminded condition 
(N= 138). Only four out of 81 participants opted to purchase the reminder service (%5), and these 
four participants were combined with the free reminder condition to form the reminded condition 
(N=65).  
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors in making the decision to 
participate in the additional questionnaire in the future, we conducted a logistical regression 
analysis (N= 202). The best overall model included the variable of payment amount at step 1. The 
overall model of best fit was marginally significant, X2(1) = 3.3, p= 071. (see Table 3). The only 
variable to approach significance was amount of money, X2(1) = 3.24 p =. 072, indicating a similar 
pattern as found in Experiment 1 in that more participants opting in when the payment was high 
($8) vs. low ($4). 
 
Table 3. 
Variables in the Equation 
  
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Money -.515 .286 3.243 1 .072 .598 .341 1.047 
Constant .814 .203 16.075 1 .000 2.257     
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 Task completion.   Of the 77 participants who claimed that they would return for the second 
session, 53 people (68%) actually returned as promised, whereas 24 people (33%) did not return.   
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors of task completion behaviour, we 
conducted a logistical regression analysis (N= 53). Step 1 included the variable of time. The final 
overall model of best fit was marginally significant, X2(1) = 3.4, p= .062 (see Table 4). The only 
variable that was found to approach significance was time delay, X2(1) = 3.4, p= .067, indicating that 
participants were more likely to complete the questionnaire in the next day condition compared to 
the next week condition. 
 
Table 4.  
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Time .918 .501 3.355 1 .067 2.505 .938 6.692 
Constant -1.237 .379 10.669 1 .001 .290     
 
Participants in the reminded group explicitly indicated at least one of the reminders that we 
sent as a reason for remembering to return. Most participants in the unreminded group that 
returned indicated initiating their own reminders to help them remember to return. Somewhat 
expected,  it seemed that for some participants who completed session 2, was not based on 
remembering to return, but rather  were reminded about the target behaviour after passing by the 
booth and remembering that they took part in the study. Finally, participants who did not return for 
the second session (after agreeing to do so), were contacted. Twelve out of 24 participants who 
failed to return (50%) contacted us back. All of the participants, who contacted us, said the primary 
reason why they did not return for the second session was due to “forgetting”. This shows evidence 
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that participants were not necessarily discounting the future event, but simply forgot to return, due 
to memory failure. 
Summary of results and discussion.   Due to the small number of participants in each 
condition, many of the effects failed to reach a significant level of p <.05. Regardless, the patterns in 
this study were markedly similar to the results found in Experiment 1. At the time of the decision, 
participants were found to be sensitive to the desirability factor of payment amount, as more 
participants opted to complete the second questionnaire when the payment was high compared to 
when the payment option was low (43%, for the $8 condition vs. 31% in the $4 dollar condition), 
however amount of money was not a significant predictor of actual task completion (see Figure 5). 
Finally, the results show that although time delay was not a significant factor in opt-in decisions, it 
was a significant predictor of task completion in that 77% of participants actually returned in the 
next day condition compared to 58% that returned in the next week condition (see Figure 6). The 
reminder variable was not found to be a significant (p>.1) predictor in either the decision of opting 
in or actual task completion.  
The findings add to Experiment 1 results, showing that participants are not only unwilling to 
pay for a reminder, but that participants will only opt into the reminder service when it is offered as 
an option free of charge. This contributes to the idea that participants do not value the reminder 

































 So far we have shown that predictability of behaviour is influenced by various 
translatability cues (or the ease at which an intention can be turned into action) that are often not 
reflected in people’s intentions at the time of a decision.  Research on temporal construal theory 
posits that compared to an abstract construal, construing events concretely may help to identify 
potential obstacles that may hinder performance (and thereby lead to less optimistic decisions) 
(Peetz, Buehler & Wilson, 2010).  For Experiment 3, we sought to examine whether construal level 
affects the sensitivity of self-predictions (and decisions contingent on self-predictions) to the impact 
of situational factors that affect how readily current intentions can be translated into future 
behaviour.  
Since our main concern for this study was lack of power (Experiment 2), and that many 
participants were being “reminded” about the target behaviour spontaneously by passing the 
booth, a couple key changes were made to the next experiment. First, the session 2 task was 
modified by programming the questionnaire online in order to make completion of the task a little 
easier (thereby increasing opt in rates) and to ensure that return behaviour is reliant on memory 
rather than “being in the right place at the right time”. Also, in order to recruit a large number of 
people, participants were recruited from two different locations; one group of participants were 
recruited from the SLC (referred to as Experiment 3a) as in the Experiment 1, and the other group 
of participants were recruited through an online participant pool (SONA) (referred to as Experiment 
3b). In order to make redemption easier for those who complete the online questionnaire, payment 
upon completion was changed into a lottery in that participants would be entered into a draw for a 
gift certificate to Amazon.com (in which they would have a 1/10 chance of winning).  
We ran a preliminary data analysis to examine whether we can combine the data sets from 
the two locations, a test of between-subjects effect was conducted on all the variables. For the 
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dependent variable of decision, a significant difference emerged between location and construal 
level,  F(1, 321)= 4.84, p= .028.  Similarly, for task completion a significant difference emerged 
between location and time, F(1,232)= 2.97, p= .08. Due to these differences between the two data 



















 Participants.   121 undergraduate students (57 men and 64 women) were recruited from 
the Student Life Centre at the University of Waterloo in Southern Ontario, Canada. The average age 
of the participants was 20 years, SD= 2.44. One participant who already completed the study was 
excluded from analysis. One additional participant who did not speak English was eliminated from 
the analysis. 
Procedure.   In Experiment 3a, we primed participants to think in either a concrete or 
abstract way using the mindset manipulation by Freitas, Gollwitzer and Trope (2004). Specifically 
those primed with a concrete mindset were prompted to answer a question focusing on “how” they 
will achieve a goal. Whereas those primed with an abstract mindset were asked to answer a 
question focusing on “why” they would like to achieve a goal. The goal that we used across all 
participants was how/why they would like to, “maintain a healthy lifestyle”. Participants listed three 
ways in how/why improving and maintaining their physical health could help them meet important 
life goals. 
After completing the manipulation task participants were presented with the choice to 
participate in an additional online questionnaire, which upon completion of the questionnaire 
would be entered in a draw where participants would have a 1 in 10 chance of winning a gift 
certificate. Participants at this time were also informed on how much the gift certificate would be 
worth ($40/$80) and also when they would be required to complete the online questionnaire (next 
day/1 week later). Participants also had the choice not to opt into the online questionnaire and if 
they chose not to participant in the future questionnaire they would instead be entered in a draw 
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for a $10 gift certificate. Lastly, we randomly assigned participants to one of three reminder 
conditions. In the free reminder condition, participants were promised a reminder in the form of an 
email the night before they were expected to return. In the purchased reminder condition, 
participants were presented with a choice to receive a reminder service for the cost of $10, which 
would be deducted from their final gift certificate amount, if they win the draw (making the final 
gift certificate worth $30 or $70). Finally, participants in the no reminder condition were given no 
such information about a reminder (no email reminder was sent out) and served as our control 
group.   
Participants who decided they wanted to complete the online questionnaire were given an 
information card containing relevant information about the questionnaire. Specifically, participants 
were given a login id and a corresponding password along with a link in order for them to complete 
the online questionnaire. Additional email and text reminders were sent to those in the reminded 
group the night before they were expected to complete the online questionnaire. All gift certificate 
winners were drawn and contacted at the end of the term.  
Hypotheses 
  Based on previous research, we expected to see an insensitivity of decisions to situational 
factors (reminder and time); and that level of construal would moderate the impact of the 
situational factors on decisions. As in our previous studies we manipulated situational factors by 
using the reminder service used in the previous studies, and time delay. This leads us to our third 
and final hypothesis about the factor of construal. 
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H4: Participants primed with a more concrete mind frame are hypothesized to be more 
likely to accurately weight translatability factors relative to desirability factors when making 
their decision to opt-in, compared to those primed with an abstract mind frame. 
Results 
 Decision.   Overall, 18 (15%) participants decided to forgo the chance at being entered in a 
larger draw for a gift certificate and chose to be entered in the $10 draw. 103 (85%) participants 
chose to forego the chance at winning a $10 gift certificate and opted-in to complete the second 
questionnaire for a chance at winning a gift certificate worth a larger amount of money. Seven 
participants out of 41 (17%) decided to purchase the reminder service. These participants were 
combined with the free reminder condition to form the group of participants who were reminded 
(N= 47). The other participants who chose not to purchase a reminder service were combined with 
the control condition to form the unreminded condition (N= 74).  
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors in making the decision to 
participate in the additional questionnaire in the future, we conducted a logistical regression 
analysis (N= 121). The only significant predictor in the overall model was that of construal level. The 
overall model was significant, X2(1) = 10.85, p =. 001 (see Table 5). The predictor of construal level 
was significant, indicating that participants were about 7 times more likely to opt-into the online 
questionnaire after the concrete prime manipulation compared to those who were primed with the 









B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Construal 1.903 .663 8.235 1 .004 6.705 1.828 24.591 
Constant -2.979 .592 25.334 1 .000 .051     
 
 
 Task Completion.   Of the 103 participants who claimed they would complete the online 
questionnaire, 58 (56%) actually completed the online questionnaire, whereas 45 (44%) did not. In 
order to examine what variables were best predictors of task completion, we conducted a logistical 
regression analysis (N=58). The overall model was significant, X2 (1) = 7.64, p =. 006 (see Table 6).  
The only predictor variable that reached significance was the reminder variable. As in previous 
results we found that participants were more than 3 times more likely to complete the online 
questionnaire when they were promised, and received a reminder service (72%), compared to the 




B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1 Reminder 1.150 .428 7.226 1 .007 3.157 1.365 7.301 
Constant -.949 .340 7.793 1 .005 .387     
 
 
 Summary of results and discussion.   Construal level was found to influence the decision to 
complete the second task, in that 95% of participants opted to complete the online questionnaire in 
the concrete condition, compared to only 75% opting in, in the abstract condition. This finding is 
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somewhat contradictory to what was predicted. Also, unexpectedly there was no interaction 
between construal level and time delay on opt-in decisions. However, the finding that more 
participants in the concrete condition opted-in for the secondary task may indicate that participants 
with a concrete mind frame were more likely to believe that they would actually complete the 
questionnaire compared to the abstract condition. And, since there was no effect of construal on 
actual task completion behaviour we cannot ascertain that those in the concrete condition were 
actually better able to gauge their decision on translatability factors (see Figure 7). The fact that 
85% of participants opted-into the second questionnaire is itself an anomalous finding since our 
first two experiments yielded an opt-in rate ranging from 38%-49%. Such a high opt-in rate may 
have cause a ceiling effect which may have eliminated any effect that may have been there. Again, 
for return behaviour we found evidence that even though participants were not sensitive to the 
reminder option at the time of the decision, those who were reminded about the online 
questionnaire were more likely to actually complete it, as 72% in the reminded group completed 
the task, and only 45% in the unreminded group actually completed the online questionnaire as 
























Participants.   216 undergraduate students (70 men and 142 women; 4 undisclosed) were 
recruited from SONA at the University of Waterloo in Southern Ontario, Canada. The average age of 
the participants was 20 years, SD= 3.48.  
Procedure.   The procedure was exactly the same as that in Experiment 3a, with the two 
differences being; a) the location that participants were being recruited from and b) that 
participants received a participation credit for their time, in addition to being entered in a lottery 
for a gift certificate. 
 
Results 
 Decision.   Overall, 71 (33%) participants decided to forgo the chance at being entered in a 
larger draw for a gift certificate and chose to be entered in the $10 draw. 145 (67%) participants 
chose to forego the chance at winning a $10 gift certificate and opted-in to complete the second 
questionnaire for a chance at winning a gift certificate worth a larger amount of money. Eleven 
participants out of 69 participants (16%) decided to purchase the reminder service. These 
participants were combined with the free reminder condition to form the group of participants who 
were reminded (N= 84). The other participants who chose not to purchase a reminder service were 
combined with the control condition to form the unreminded condition (N= 132). 
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors in making the decision to complete 
the online questionnaire in the future, we conducted a logistical regression analysis (N= 216). The 
best overall model included the variables of time and reminder at step 1, and a time by reminder 
interaction at step 2. The overall best model of fit was significant, X2(3) = 14.94 p= .002 (see Table 
7). The time delay variable was significant, X2 (1) = 21.4, p=.007 indicating that more participants 
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opted to complete the online questionnaire next week vs. the next day. The time by reminder 
interaction reached significance, X2 (1) =9.7, p =. 027. In order to discover where the differences 
are, we split file on time and re-ran the regression with reminder condition separately for the next 
week and next day condition. The regression was significant for the next week condition, indicating 
that participants were more 4.5 times more likely to opt-in into the next week condition when a 
reminder service was offered, X2 (1) = 11.27, p=.002. The regression as non-significant for the next 




B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 






Time -1.565 .581 7.259 1 .007 .209 .067 .653 
Reminder .134 .415 .103 1 .748 1.143 .506 2.580 
Reminder 
by Time 
1.511 .682 4.910 1 .027 4.532 1.191 17.246 
Constant -.539 .336 2.569 1 .109 .583     
 
 
Task completion.   Of the 145 participants who claimed that they would complete the online 
questionnaire, 74 (51%) actually completed the questionnaire, whereas 71 (49%) did not.  
 In order to examine what variables were best predictors of task completion behaviour, we 
conducted a logistical regression analysis (N= 74).The model of best fit included the variables of 
construal and time delay at step 1. Step 2 included a construal by reminder interaction term. The 
final overall model was significant, X2(4) = 10.87, p= .028 (see Table 8). The time variable was 
significant, X2 (1) = 5.22, p=.02 indicating that participants were more than 2 times more likely to 
complete the online questionnaire in the next day condition (61%) vs. the week condition (43%).  
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A construal by reminder interaction approached significance, p=.058.  In order to further 
examine where the differences are, we split file on construal and re-ran the regression with 
reminder separately for each construal condition. The results indicated that reminded participants 
were more likely to complete the questionnaire if they were in the abstract condition compared to 
the abstract/unreminded condition, X2 (1) = 5.12, p= .027. In comparison, no differences were 
found in actual task completion between the reminder groups and the concrete construal 
conditions, X2 (1) =.22,  p = .64, indicating that the reminder service did not have as much influence 




B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 








Time .811 .355 5.217 1 .022 2.251 1.122 4.517 
Construal -.700 .524 1.790 1 .181 .496 .178 1.385 
Reminder -.070 .487 .021 1 .885 .932 .359 2.420 
Construal by 
Reminder 
1.326 .700 3.588 1 .058 3.766 .955 14.846 
Constant -.498 .405 1.514 1 .219 .608     
 
Summary of results and discussion.  At the time of the decision participants were insensitive 
to translatability cue of time delay, as 73% participants opted in, in the next week condition 
(compared to 61% in the next day condition), but actual task completion was more likely in the next 
day condition (60%) compared to the next week condition (43%) (see Figure 9). In addition, a 
reminder by time interaction indicate that participants were more sensitive to the reminder service 
when it was offered in the next week condition compared to the next day condition (see Figure 11), 
41 
 
indicating that participants were somewhat more sensitive to the impact of the reminder at the 
long time delay vs. short time delay. 
Although we did not find evidence for our hypothesis, there was a significant construal by 
reminder interaction that is worth noting (see Figure 12). The results show that the reminder 
service boosted task completion (65%) for the abstract construal condition compared to when they 
received no reminder (39%). On the other hand, the reminder seemed to be  less effective for those 
primed with a concrete mind frame as no differences were found in actual task completion in either 















































Summary.  The present research focused on the role of current intentions on self-
predictions of future behaviour. The decision that participants were faced with required a 
comparison of the expected value of the two options.  In particular, the EV of the second option 
depends on the perceived or self-predicted probability that a target future behaviour will in fact be 
carried out. Making a good decision, therefore, is dependent on whether the decision maker can 
accurately estimate the likelihood of carrying out the future behaviour. Across 3 experiments, we 
examined how factors (or information cues) that are available at the time of the decision impacted 
predictions (implicit in decisions) and resulting behaviour (time 2 task completion). Table 9 provides 
a summary of the main findings for each experiment. 
 
Table 9.  
Experiment DV Factor 
Reminder Temporal 
Delay 
Amount of $ Construal 
1 Decision  X * X N/A 
Task Completion / X *  
2 Decision   / N/A 
Task Completion  /  
3a Decision    X 
Task Completion X    
3b Decision X X *   
Task Completion X X *  X 
Note. “X” indicates a statistically significant effect (p<.05), a “/” indicates a marginally significant effect (P< .1). 
* The effects of this factor were in opposite direction for decision vs. task completion. 
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Overall, the results provide evidence that decisions based on (implicit) self-predictions 
often overweight the extent that current intentions will affect behaviour. Decisions were found to 
be influenced more by the desirability factors and less by factors that affect translatability, leading 
to suboptimal decisions.  We can review the general patterns that emerged in these experiments in 
comparison to our hypotheses. 
H1: Translatability factor of reminder is hypothesized to be underweighted in opt-in 
decisions relative to its actual impact. 
 
The current experiments showed that the reminder service was greatly undervalued at the 
time of the decision, even though it was found to increase the likelihood of task completion.  
Experiment 1 found that the reminder did not influence decisions, but was found to be a marginally 
significant predictor of actual task completion.  Experiment 2, due to low power did not show any 
significant differences with regards to the reminder service but did demonstrate that compared to 
Experiment 1 (where only 3 people chose to pay $1 for a reminder service),  the reminder service 
was sought only when it was offered for free ( 92% of participants opted in for a reminder service).  
This suggests that there was nothing inherently unattractive about the reminder (e.g., that it was 
perceived as intrusive or annoying) itself; rather, when offered at a cost, participants did not feel its 
impact would be big enough to merit paying for it. Experiment 3a found that although decisions 
were not sensitive to the factor of reminder actual task completion showed a reminder effect in 
that those who received a reminder service were more likely to complete the secondary task.   
Experiment 3b showed that participants were at least slightly sensitive to the impact that the 
reminder would have at longer time delays, as those in the reminder group were more likely to opt 
into the second task when faced with a decision to carry out the behaviour next week vs. next day. 
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Experiment 3b also found that participants in the abstract construal condition actually benefitted 
more from the reminder service than those in the concrete condition, indicating that the reminder 
may have increased implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) more so in the abstract than in 
the concrete construal condition. 
 
H2: Implicit intentions are hypothesized to be less predictive at longer time intervals; 
therefore self-predictions will be insufficiently sensitive to this translatability factor.  
 
The current experiments consistently showed that participants’ decisions were less 
sensitive to the translatability factor of temporal delay and showed evidence that the decisions 
were less predictive when the temporal delay was longer. Experiment 1 and 3b found that the 
factor of time delay influenced decisions and task completion in opposite directions, in that more 
people opted to complete the second task in the next week condition (vs. next day) but were more 
likely to actually return in the next day condition. Experiment 2 found that decisions were 
unaffected by the factor of time delay, but it was significant predictor in actual return behaviour. 
Results indicated again, that participants were more likely to complete the second task in the next 
day vs. next week condition.  This interesting pattern reversal competes with economic theories of 
decision making which would suggest that temporal discounting would affect how these options are 
valued and would expect the pattern to be in the opposite direction; providing further evidence 
that temporal discounting did not play a significant part in the results.  
 
H3: Monetary incentives should have an effect on self-predictions of returning (and hence 




The experiments showed evidence that participants tend to overestimate how much the 
monetary outcome will affect future behaviour. Experiment 1 found this pattern, as the desirability 
factor of money influenced the decision to complete the secondary task, but actual task completion 
was unaffected by monetary incentives.  Experiment 2 found marginal differences showing that 
decisions based on implicit self-predictions were influenced again by the monetary incentive, even 
though it had no influence on actual task completion.  In contrast, Experiment 3a and 3b did not 
show any effects of money on decisions or completion behaviour. The fact that no differences were 
found could have been due to the way compensation was provided to participants. The payment in 
Experiment 3 was changed to a lottery in which participants were entered into a draw for a gift 
certificate (with a 1 in 10 chance of winning). The amount of money was changed from $4 to $40 
(for the low payment condition) and $8 to $80 (for the high payment condition).  It is possible that, 
compared to the sure gain of $4 or $8 in the previous studies, the lottery payment was viewed 
simply as a chance of winning some money, with little sensitivity to the amount of money that could 
be won.  
H4: Participants primed with a more concrete mind frame are expected to be more likely to 
accurately weight translatability factors relative to desirability factors when making their 
decision to opt-in, compared to those primed with an abstract mind frame. 
Experiment 3, which had some significant changes with regards to its methodology, 
included a manipulation intended to induce participants to think about the decision options in 
either a concrete or abstract way. We collected data from two different locations to increase 
power, but in doing so we found significant differences in the influence of these factors depending 
on location. Hence, we treated the two sets of data separately.  Experiment 3a did not show the 
proposed findings, perhaps due to the large percentage of participants opting into the second 
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questionnaire. However, a main effect on construal did emerge indicating  that decisions were 
significantly affected by construal level, in that more participants opted-in for the second option 
when they were primed with a concrete mindset. Research on temporal construal theory posits that 
compared to an abstract construal, construing events concretely may help to identify potential 
obstacles that may hinder performance, which leads us to suggest that participants primed with a 
concrete mind frame may have been more accurate in predicting that their subjective probability of 
completing the second option future behaviour was low, hence opting more often for the 
immediate reward. However, since there was no effect of construal on actual task completion 
behaviour we cannot ascertain that those in the concrete condition were actually better able to 
gauge their decision on translatability factors. Finally, as mentioned before, Experiment 3b found a 
reminder by construal interaction showing that participants in the abstract construal condition 
actually benefitted more from the reminder service than those in the concrete condition.  
Our research contributes to previous findings, particularly those of Koehler et al. (2011), by 
using an objective behaviour measure, and by examining a wider variety of factors which influence 
decisions contingent on self-predictions. Although intention strength was never actually measured, 
we reason that self-predictions that guide decisions in this task are based on current intention 
strength, which in turn tends to be insensitive to factors influencing translatability.  
Implications. The most compelling and consistent basic finding in these experiments is the 
pattern reversal between the opt-in decisions and actual return behaviour on time delay. It is 
interested to note that the pattern found in the current experiments are inconsistent with 
economic theories of decision making, especially that of temporal discounting which would suggest 
that people would most often prefer the sooner reward and discount the value of a temporally 
distant reward. Instead, the results show that participants more often chose the option that is 
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further from the present, but are actually most likely to complete the behaviour when it is 
temporally closer in time.  This pattern is unique and is a great demonstration in suggesting that 
there is a psychological discrepancy between how people believe they are going to behave and 
their actual behaviour, when making self-predictions of future behaviour.   
  Our studies are not limited to observing what variables influence the biased decision 
making process, but can provide insight on ways to de-bias the over-optimistic effect (Experiment 
3b). In particular, we showed that the reminder service served as a cue for “how” the future 
behaviour could be possible, that was especially beneficial for those primed with an abstract mind 
frame. Perhaps, it was the mere experience of causing participants to “stop and think” about how 
they will perform the future task after already committing to the behaviour, which influenced 
higher return rates.  
These results are consistent with some research which shows that having an abstract frame 
of mind may actually help sustain motivational intensity (Freitas, Clark, Kim & Levy, 2009), but 
extends this research by suggesting that by adding concreteness to the situation, it can help 
improve validity of the predictions.  In other words, abstractness may emphasize how well the goal 
will be accomplished, and the reminder emphasizes goal completion (Naufel & Beike, 2009).  The 
results suggest that those who frame events more abstractly may benefit more from reminders 
when making self-predictions of future behaviours. 
These results are also consistent with other research showing that by initiating a more 
deliberative system, these biases can be overcome. For example, supplying feedback about people’s 
previous performance on a similar task before prediction task duration increased predictive 
accuracy (Roy, Mitten & Christenfeld, 2008). Also, individuals who initially estimated their 
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behaviour in an ideal world subsequently make more realistic predictions (Tanner & Carlson, 2009). 
Research on implementation intentions suggests that people can use a self-regulating tool in the 
form of an if-than-plan to manage successful intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). Finally, research on the 
unpacking effect, shows that when an event is “unpacked” into sub-components it can lead to 
better predictions (Kruger & Evans, 2004).  
Future Directions.  For the future, I plan on examining these effects in a more eco-logically 
valid context by running a natural field study. One of the more interesting findings in these studies 
is the reverse pattern with prediction and actual completion with regards to time delay. I would be 
interested in examining whether this reversal would occur in a real world situation. For example, we 
can run this study in a coffee shop and provide customers with an option of receiving $1 off their 
coffee today or receiving a $5 coupon that must be used either next week or within the next month. 
Opt-in rates in this scenario can be measured and actual behaviour could be tracked to see whether 
the customers actually return to redeem the coupons. This is an avenue worth exploring as it would 
be a novel finding that would contribute significantly to self-prediction literature and it would also 
contribute to the validity of the findings, if it were examined in a real world consumer situation.  
  It was difficult in the current studies to elicit explicit intention strength ratings as we 
feared that it would give away the purpose of the experiment. Rather than assuming that people’s 
decisions are contingent on their intention strength, it would be beneficial for a future study to 
come up with a cover story which can help explain why we would like to obtain a measure of 
intention strength without compromising the research.   
Another interesting line of future research would be to see whether participants respond 
differently to various types of reminders. For example, a more informational reminder may include 
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a lengthy script of concrete information on how to complete the future task, which can be 
compared to a reminder involving something much more, such as a link to the experiment which 
may be seen as less informative but may increase the translatability of the future behaviour. 
Participants who mentally construe events in either a concrete or abstract way may affect how well 
the reminders influence task completion behaviour. 
Linking memory to the optimistic bias was not of primary interest in this paper, but does 
deserve some attention.  In order to carry out a future behaviour, participants must draw on 
prospective memory. Future research might focus on the role of memory in eliciting optimistic self-
prediction of future behaviour.  Is it that people may fail to recall a similar experience that causes 
one to be overly optimistic? Or a similar experience can be recalled, but it is dismissed or incorrectly 
incorporated at the time of prediction? The former can be explained by the memory bias account, 
which is the tendency for people to remember tasks as taking less time than they actually do, 
leading to an underestimation of how long similar tasks will take in the future (Roy, Christenfeld & 
McKenzie, 2005). Other research suggests the latter often occurs, since participants like to believe 
that their self-prediction is independent from past experiences they tend to focus on the more 
optimistic scenarios and disregard the pessimistic scenarios (Newby-Clark et al., 2000). The fact that 
participants often do not rely on past performance appropriately when making self-predictions is an 
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